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TITLE OF THE REVIEW 
Third Party Policing for Reducing Crime and Disorder: A Systematic Review 
BACKGROUND 
A substantial body of criminological literature demonstrates that crime and disorder clusters 
at specific places (e.g., Braga, Papachristos, & Hureau, 2010; Sherman, Gartin, & Buerger, 
1989), amongst particular types of people (e.g., Bergman & Andershed, 2009; Jennings & 
Reingle, 2012; Moffit, 1993, 2003; Nagin, Farrington, & Moffit, 1995), and at particular 
times of the day, week, month and year (see Bowers and colleagues, 1998, 2004; Farrell & 
Pease, 1994; Johnson et al., 2007; Ratcliffe and colleagues, 1998, 2002, 2004, 2008; 
Townsley, 2008; Uittenbogaard & Ceccato, 2012; Wells, Wu, & Ye, 2012). Research shows 
that policing interventions that target criminogenic places, people and times are effective for 
controlling crime and disorder problems. For example, we know that directed police patrols 
controls crime and disorder at hotspots (see Braga et al., 2012 for a review); mandatory 
arrest reduces recidivism for some domestic violence offenders (Ariel & Sherman, 2012; 
Maxwell, Garner, & Fagan, 2002); and crackdowns followed by target hardening interupts 
the temporal clustering of repeat burglary victimisation (e.g., Forrester Chatterton, & Pease, 
1988; Farrell et al., 1998).  
Third Party Policing (TPP) is an approach that has expanded the capacity of police to target 
geographical, temporal and individual factors that underlie crime and disorder. When using 
TPP, police partner with external entities (‘third parties’) – such as, housing authorities, 
licensing authorities, business owners – in order to harness their legal powers to regulate the 
underlying social, physical and/or economic conditions that generate crime and disorder 
problems (Buerger & Mazerolle, 1994, 1998; Green Mazerolle & Roehl, 1998; Mazerolle & 
Ransley, 2005). For example, Eck and Wartell (1998) illustrate how nuisance abatement 
legislation can be used to modify conditions thought to be generating drug-related crime and 
disorder at particular addresses. Generally, this type of legislation requires property owners 
to abate designated ‘nuisance’ offences at their properties and provides regulatory bodies 
with the legal power to impose sanctions against property owners should the problem 
persist. In Eck and Wartell’s experiment, police partnered with San Deigo’s Code 
Compliance Department (third party) to work with property owners to address drug-related 
problems at the identified properties (e.g., evicting offending tenants). If police found 
persistent drug activity, nuisance abatement legislation provided the compliance department 
with the legal power to fine property owners or close their properties for up to one year.  
The trend towards partnership approaches, like TPP, has emerged out of global 
transformations in governance and regulation (see Mazerolle & Ransley, 2005 for review). 
These transformations have led to a proliferation of regulatory agencies and laws 
(Braithwaite, 1999, 2000) and a blurring of boundaries between traditional categories of law 
(Cheh, 1998; Mazerolle & Ransley, 2005). As a result, policing now emphasises the use of 
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partnerships with external crime control ‘nodes’ or entities that sit within broader regulatory 
networks (Crawford et al., 2005, 2006, 2009; Ericson, 2007; Jones & Newburn, 2006; 
Loader, 2000). Through these partnerships, police are provided with a broad range of new 
opportunities and strategies to control and prevent crime.       
TPP is identified as one of eight key policing innovations (Weisburd & Braga, 2006) that is 
part of “a new crime control establishment” (Garland, 2001, p. 17) increasingly drawn upon 
by police in times of fiscal restraint (see Ayling, Grabosky, & Shearing, 2009). Mazerolle and 
Ransley (2005) demonstrate that TPP is possibly quite effective for reducing a wide-range of 
crime and disorder problems. However, TPP is not without controversy. Some scholars note 
potential negative side effects of TPP and question the ethical nature of the approach (see, 
for example, Desmond & Valdez, 2012; Mazerolle & Ransley, 2005; Meares, 2006). 
Therefore, we propose a systematic review of the empirical TPP literature to examine the 
impact of TPP on crime and disorder.  
OBJECTIVES 
The primary objective of this review is to systematically evaluate the impact of TPP 
interventions on crime and/or disorder. We will achieve this by synthesising the results of 
published and unpublished empirical research on TPP interventions and by addressing the 
following research questions: 
1. What impact does TPP have on crime and/or disorder? 
2. Does the impact of TPP vary by the type of TPP partnership? 
3. Does the impact of TPP vary by the type of legal lever or third party utilised? 
4. Does the impact of TPP vary by the type of crime or disorder targeted? 
5. Does the impact of TPP vary by the target of the TPP intervention (e.g., offenders 
versus crime places)? 
EXISTING REVIEWS 
In 2005, Mazerolle and Ransley conducted a systematic search for empirical TPP literature. 
The authors examined effect sizes and provided a qualitative review or eligible research, but 
did not perform a meta-analysis. We propose an updated systematic search and the first 
systematic review of TPP that (a) is theoretically and methodologically refined, and (b) 
includes a meta-analysis.  
INTERVENTION 
A TPP intervention occurs when police work in partnership with one or more external third 
parties to control or prevent crime problem(s), through the use of legal levers available to the 
third party (Figure 1). There are four key components in this definition that are critical for 
 
 
4       The Campbell Collaboration | www.campbellcollaboration.org 
understanding TPP in practice: (1) third party, (2) legal lever, (3) crime or disorder problem, 
and (4) the nature of the partnership.  
(1) A ‘third party’ is an entity operating within a legal framework that provides the third 
party with legal powers not directly available to police. A third party can be an individual 
(e.g., property owner), an organisation (e.g., Pharmacy Guild), a business (e.g., a bar), 
regulatory authorities (e.g., liquor licensing authority, local council, school), government 
departments (e.g., education department), or a network of collaborating agencies (e.g., see 
Green, 1996). 
(2) The legal powers possessed by third parties, referred to as ‘legal levers’, create a crime 
control or crime prevention capacity that police seek to harness in TPP interventions. 
Example legal levers include: conduct licensing (e.g., alcohol, firearms), mandatory reporting 
(e.g., chemical sales, child abuse), orders to control behaviour (e.g., gang or domestic 
violence injunctions, truancy regulations), orders under regulatory codes (e.g., building, fire, 
health and safety, noise codes), and property controls (e.g., drug nuisance abatement). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Third Party Policing Model 
 
(3) The term ‘crime problem’ within TPP reflects the idea that there are multiple 
criminogenic components underlying crime events. TPP interventions aim to modify one 
underlying component of a crime problem (e.g., actual offenders), or multiple components 
(e.g., actual crime place or place managers) through a third party’s legal levers. 
(4) The final feature of TPP is the active role police play in establishing a partnership with 
third parties in order to harness their crime control or prevention capacity. TPP partnerships 
can be described according to the TPP Partnership Matrix (Figure 2), where TPP 
partnerships are categorised along two continuums: number of third parties and type of 
engagement. TPP partnerships can involve single or multiple third parties and techniques to 
engage third parties range from collaborative to coercive on the ‘Engagement Continuum’. 
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Figure 2. Third Party Policing Partnership Matrix 
 
POPULATION 
As we are interested in the impact of TPP on crime and/or disorder in general the population 
will include people or places. Therefore, we will code and analyse all empirical literature that 
(a) satisfies TPP intervention criteria (see previous section); (b) where the unit of analysis is 
people or places; (c) reports on a crime and/or disorder outcome (see section below); and (d) 
falls within the range of study designs we will consider for the review (see section below). 
OUTCOMES 
Crime and disorder is the primary outcome of interest for this review. Because of the 
variation in measurement across criminological literature (see Addington, 2009) the scope 
of crime and disorder outcomes considered for the review will be relatively wide. We will 
code and analyse: 
• All categories of crime (e.g., property, violent, drug offences) at all levels of analysis 
(e.g., individuals, places) 
• All categories of crime (e.g., property, violent, drug offences) 
• Official measures of crime (e.g., arrest data, crime rates, calls-for-service data)  
• Unofficial measures of crime (e.g., citizen reported crime)  
• Systematic observations of social disorder (e.g., public intoxication, loitering, 
solicitation, excess noise) 
• Systematic observations of physical disorder (e.g., dilapidated or abandoned 
properties, rubbish, graffiti) 
STUDY DESIGNS 
Our review will consider quantitative research utilising experimental, quasi-experimental or 
interrupted time-series evaluation designs. Evaluations must include a valid comparison 
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group that does not receive the intervention. Eligible designs include: randomised controlled 
trials, natural experiments, non-equivalent control group designs, time-series designs, 
regression point displacement designs, and regression-discontinuity designs. To be included 
in the meta-analysis, evaluations must have also reported an effect-size, or sufficient detail to 
allow an effect size to be calculated. 
Our preliminary examination of the literature found several examples of methodologically 
robust evaluations of TPP interventions that are eligible for inclusion in this review. For 
example, Eck and Wartell (1998, see above) evaluated the DART intervention using a 
randomised controlled trial design whereby residential properties were randomly assigned to 
a control group (n = 42) or one of two treatment groups (n = 42 and n =37). The main 
outcome measure used by Eck and Wartell was 30 months of post-intervention official crime 
which was aggregated into five six-month intervals for each site. Similarly, Mazerolle and 
colleagues (1998, 2000) evaluated Oakland’s Beat Health Program (California) by randomly 
allocating street blocks to either the control business-as-usual condition (n = 50) or 
experimental Beat Health program condition (n = 50). In Mazerolle et al. (1998), site-level 
systematic observations of physical and systematic disorder at the time of allocation and 5-
months later were used as the outcome measure, whilst Mazerolle et al. (2000) used street-
level calls-for-service data over a 39-month period (22 months pre- and 12-months post-
intervention) as the outcome measure.  Weisburd and Green (1995) evaluated the Jersey City 
Drug Market Analysis Program that included TPP strategies, also using a randomised 
controlled trial design. Using a randomised block design, hotspots were categorised into four 
groups depending their level of calls-for-service and arrest activity and then randomly 
allocated, within these groups, to either the control condition (business-as-usual, n = 28) or 
the experimental condition (n = 28). Calls-for-service data at each hotspot for the periods 
seven months before and seven months after the intervention was used the outcome 
measure. Other authors have also evaluated TPP strategies using quasi-experimental 
techniques (e.g., see Baker & Wolfer, 2003; Higgins & Couldren, 2000). Therefore, we expect 
that our systematic search will identify a sufficient number of eligible studies for inclusion in 
the review.     
We anticipate that some TPP research will utilise time-series designs without a valid 
comparison group (see Mazerolle & Ransley, 2005). Whilst acknowledging the lower 
methodological quality of these studies, we will include time-series evaluations without a 
comparison group. To address potential bias, we will perform a subgroup analysis using 
research design as a predictor variable. 
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ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
• Content: Mazerolle, Higginson, Eggins 
• Systematic review methods: Higginson, Eggins  
• Statistical analysis: Higginson 
• Information retrieval: Eggins 
 
POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
Professor Mazerolle is one of the founding TPP scholars, has evaluated a number of policing 
interventions with TPP components, and has published widely on TPP and related topics. 
Nevertheless, Professor Mazerolle is neither advocate nor critic of TPP, for example, chapter 
seven of her TPP book clearly articulates equity issues and potentially negative side effects of 
TPP. Professor Mazerolle is committed to generating a neutral and accurate review of the 
impact of TPP in order to make a meaningful contribution to crime control/prevention 
policy and practice; irrespective of whether the review’s findings contradict her previous 
research endeavours.   
FUNDING 
Internal funding. In-kind support for this review will be provided by the Institute for 
Social Science Research (ISSR) at the University of Queensland, Australia. 
External funding. Support for this review will also be provided by an Australian Research 
Council (ARC) Laureate Fellowship awarded to Professor Mazerolle in June 2010 (Multi-Site 
Trials of Third Party Policing: Building the Scientific Capacity for Experimental 
Criminology and Evidence-Based Social Policy in Australia, Grant Number: FL100100014). 
PRELIMINARY TIMEFRAME  
• Date you plan to submit a draft protocol: 19 July 2013 
• Date you plan to submit a draft review: 7 February 2014 
DECLARATION 
Authors’ responsibilities 
By completing this form, you accept responsibility for preparing, maintaining, and updating 
the review in accordance with Campbell Collaboration policy. The Coordinating Group will 
provide as much support as possible to assist with the preparation of the review.  
A draft protocol must be submitted to the Coordinating Group within one year of title 
acceptance. If drafts are not submitted before the agreed deadlines, or if we are unable to 
contact you for an extended period, the Coordinating Group has the right to de-register the 
title or transfer the title to alternative authors. The Coordinating Group also has the right to 
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de-register or transfer the title if it does not meet the standards of the Coordinating Group 
and/or the Campbell Collaboration.  
You accept responsibility for maintaining the review in light of new evidence, comments and 
criticisms, and other developments, and updating the review every five years, when 
substantial new evidence becomes available, or, if requested, transferring responsibility for 
maintaining the review to others as agreed with the Coordinating Group. 
Publication in the Campbell Library 
The support of the Coordinating Group in preparing your review is conditional upon your 
agreement to publish the protocol, finished review and subsequent updates in the Campbell 
Library. Concurrent publication in other journals is encouraged. However, a Campbell 
systematic review should be published either before, or at the same time as, its publication in 
other journals. Authors should not publish Campbell reviews in journals before they are 
ready for publication in the Campbell Library. Authors should remember to include a 
statement mentioning the published Campbell review in any non-Campbell publications of 
the review. 
I understand the commitment required to undertake a Campbell review, and 
agree to publish in the Campbell Library. Signed on behalf of the authors: 
Form completed by: Lorraine Mazerolle Date: 2 August 2013 
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